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ACCESS TO ENERGY IN INDIAN COUNTRY: THE 






By many measures, Indian tribal members live at a significant 
disadvantage as compared to non-Indian citizens when it comes to poverty, 
food security, and prevalence of violent crime. One measure of 
disadvantage that is not frequently discussed is that many Indian tribal 
members living in Indian Country do not have ready access to electrical 
energy. Yet, the Department of Energy states that over 14 billion megawatt 
hours (MWh) of solar resources and 1.1 billion MWh of wind resources are 
available in Indian Country. The presence of such abundant renewable 
energy resources begs the question of why access to energy in Indian 
Country is so low. This is especially troublesome when considering that 
wind and solar energy resources can be developed as either utility-scale 
grid-connected facilities, or as small-scale geographically distributed 
facilities that service individual households. In essence, renewable energy 
sources are the ideal forms of energy to bring energy access to Indian 
Country. This Article explores how centuries of changing federal policy 
toward Indian tribal governments and tribal members have shaped the 
current state of energy access in Indian Country. Furthermore, this Article 
examines how economic incentives such as the Investment Tax Credit, the 
Production Tax Credit, feed-in tariffs, net metering, and state renewable 
portfolio standards have been successful at bringing renewable energy 
generation online, but actually steer renewable energy development away 
from Indian Country to the detriment of tribal governments, tribal members, 
energy developers, and energy consumers.  
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I. Introduction 
Despite the prevailing notion among non-Indians that Indian reservations 
are vast desolate areas with no economic value, tribal lands actually contain 
abundant energy resources in the form of coal, oil, and natural gas.
1
 Both 
historically and presently, Indian fossil fuel resources have been a driving 
force behind many tribal economies, with royalties from surface and mining 
leases totaling $812 million in 2015.
2
 In addition to the vast fossil fuel 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Judith V. Royster, Tribal Energy Development: Renewables and the Problem of the 
Current Statutory Structures, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 92 (2012) (“Production on Indian 
lands represents 5% of domestic oil production, 8% of natural gas production, and 2% of 
coal production.”); see also Lynn H. Slade, Mineral and Energy Development on Native 
American Lands: Strategies for Addressing Sovereignty, Regulation, Rights and Culture, 56 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 5A-1 (2010). 
 2. Statistical Information, OFFICE OF NAT. RES. REVENUE, http://statistics.onrr.gov/ 
ReportTool.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (select “Reported Revenues by Category,” then 
“FY2015”). 
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resources present in Indian Country,
3
 there are abundant renewable energy 
resources available as well.
4
 
Renewable energy resources present a unique opportunity for tribal 
governments and tribal members; although fossil fuel resources are 
economically lucrative to tribes, the fossil fuel market is subject to 
extraordinary uncertainty.
5
 Additionally, fossil fuel development typically 
requires the energy-producing resource to be extracted and removed from 
Indian Country for sale on the open market.
6
 However, renewable energy 
resources such as wind and solar are not commodities that can be extracted 
and transported. Rather, renewable energy must be sold at the point of 
generation.
7
 Therefore, the tribe has greater control over the resource 
production, and may receive a greater immediate benefit from renewable 




                                                                                                                 
 3. The term “Indian Country” is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of 
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, 
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent 
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the 
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or 
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to 
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the 
same. 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). For the purposes of this Article, the term serves the general 
purpose of describing land over which Indian tribes have some regulatory or jurisdictional 
authority. When a tribe-specific or statute-specific definition is required, it will be provided. 
 4. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND 
RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL ON INDIAN LANDS 23-26 (Apr. 2000), 
https://www.eia.gov/renewable/archive/neaf0001.pdf (listing and discussing reservations 
with the highest potential for renewable energy projects). 
 5. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying America's Energy Future: The Future of 
Renewable Wind Power, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 505-07 (2008) (discussing increases in fuel 
costs and the adverse effects these increases have on consumers’ behavior). 
 6. See Benefits of Renewable Energy Use, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/renewable-energy/public-benefits-of-
renewable.html#references (last revised Apr. 8, 2013) (“[I]n most states renewable electricity 
production would reduce the need to spend money on importing coal and natural gas from 
other places.”). 
 7. See id. 
 8. Cf. Robert Gough, Tribal Wind Power Development in the Northern Great Plains, 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2004, at 57, 57 (noting that reservations bear the impacts of 
extractive energy activities while "the resident tribal communities are the limited end-use 
consumers of relatively higher-priced energy services"). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
282 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
 
 
The fact that Indian tribes control vast amounts of renewable energy 
resources at a time when the United States is committed to sourcing more 
energy from renewable sources
9
 is great for tribal governments and tribal 
members. However, despite the abundance of economically viable energy 
resources in Indian Country, by many metrics, Indian citizens in the United 
States remain at a significant social and economic disadvantage compared 
to non-Indians. Indians have less access to educational opportunities,
10
 
fewer opportunities for gainful employment,
11
 and are at an increased risk 
of violent crime.
12
 The increased risk of energy insecurity, however, is 
often overlooked when discussing Indian social issues, even though access 
to energy is critical to human health and wellbeing,
13




Unless and until tribes begin to fully utilize their renewable energy 
resources, it seems unlikely that the negative socioeconomic factors in 
Indian Country will be fully or adequately addressed. Producing power 
from renewable energy sources in Indian Country, however, is much more 
complex than producing energy from renewable resources on non-tribal 
land. This Article will explore those complexities and examine key changes 
that can or should be made to enable tribes to capitalize on their renewable 
energy resources. 
Part II of this Article will provide a brief overview of the field of energy 
law, which will provide background and context regarding energy 
regulation. Part II will also include a discussion of the federal tax incentives 
and state utility rebate incentives that presently drive much of the 
renewable energy development in the United States. Part II will examine 
how these tax and rebate incentives apply in Indian Country, and how tribes 
can best utilize these incentives to develop their renewable energy 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Press Release, Obama for Am., Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for 
America, https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/Obama_New_Energy_0804.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2017). 
 10. See ALGERNON AUSTIN, ECON. POLICY INST., EPI BRIEFING PAPER #370, NATIVE 
AMERICANS AND JOBS: THE CHALLENGE AND THE PROMISE 24 (Dec. 17, 2013). 
 11. See id. at 3. 
 12. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, POLICY INSIGHTS BRIEF: STATISTICS ON VIOLENCE 
AGAINST NATIVE WOMEN 2 (Feb. 2013). 
 13. The UN-World Bank Sustainable Energy for All program has declared universal 
access to electricity by 2030 as one of its goals, stating that access to energy is fundamental 
for economic development and prosperity. See Our Mission, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FOR ALL, 
http://www.se4all.org/our-mission (last visited Apr. 21, 2017). 
 14. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, WORLD ENERGY ASSESSMENT: ENERGY AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABILITY 44 (Sept. 2000). 
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resources. Part III will discuss tribal energy resource agreements in the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005. Part III will also examine how these 
agreements, though intended to enhance energy development in Indian 
Country through tribal self-determination and autonomy, are actually 
ineffective and paternalistic, and therefore fall short of their intended goal. 
Part IV will discuss several Indian-driven solutions to increase access to 
energy in Indian Country. Part IV will also provide a brief and high-level 
overview of these projects and is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all 
the Indian-driven energy projects undertaken in Indian Country. Rather, the 
purpose of presenting these projects is to demonstrate not only the breadth 
of need for energy development in Indian Country, but also to demonstrate 
that successful Indian Country energy development projects are 
“unconventional,” in that they address niche problems associated with 
energy insecurity in Indian Country. Furthermore, these projects 
demonstrate the value in Indian-driven solutions to Indian Country energy 
problems. Finally, Part V will offer a brief conclusion. 
II. A Brief Primer on Federal Energy Law and Policy 
When discussing energy policy in the United States, it is critical to 
understand that the United States does not have a single energy policy. 
Rather, the United States has a patchwork of policies (both state and 
federal) that regulate resource extraction, energy generation, the transfer of 
energy-producing commodities, the transmission of energy itself across 
state lines and on the national grid, and energy consumption by consumers. 
In a similar vein as the field of Indian law, these policies have developed 
over more than a century’s time, and have generally tended to be 
reactionary rather than the result of long-term strategic planning. Unlike 
Indian law, however, United States energy policy is continually changing to 
meet the changing needs of industry, commerce, and energy consumers. 
The obvious difficulty with this system is that determining or even 
coordinating regulatory authority can be difficult and confusing. This is 
especially true when resources travel through Indian Country. Some of 
these difficulties will be discussed in greater detail in later parts of this 
Article. This part is meant to give a brief overview of the United States’ 
energy policy and the agencies which oversee energy resources. 
A. The Foundation of Federal Energy Regulation 
Although there are multifarious points in time that could mark the 
beginning of energy policy in the United States, the most appropriate point 
for the purposes of this Article is the creation of the Department of the 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
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Interior (DOI) in 1849.
15
 In 1946, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
was created within the DOI to manage leases and permits for resource 
extraction on public lands controlled by the DOI.
16
 The BLM currently 
oversees leasing for coal, oil, and natural gas extraction, as well as leases 
for renewable energy development on federal lands.
17
 As it pertains to 
energy policy, the DOI regulates the land parcels in which energy-
producing commodities are located, and the BLM regulates the extraction 
of these commodities through leases to private entities.
18
 Prior to expansive 
electricity grids and oil and natural gas pipelines, this regulatory authority 
represented a substantial portion of United States energy policy since 
energy was typically generated near the geographic locality where the 
energy-producing commodity was extracted. 
In 1887, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act, which created 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
19
 The ICC was charged with 
regulating the transportation of goods across state lines by common 
carriers.
20
 The ICC’s regulatory authority was expanded by the Hepburn 
Act, which granted the ICC the authority to set a ceiling on the maximum 
rate that railroads could charge for the transportation of goods.
21
 This 
authority gave the ICC a substantial amount of influence over energy 
prices, as energy-producing commodities began traveling from 
geographically isolated areas to larger population centers.
22
 The Hepburn 
Act also represents the first substantial step by the federal government in 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, 9 Stat. 395.  
 16. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, § 403, 60 Stat. 1097, 1100. The Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (“BIA”) is also housed within the DOI. BIA is responsible for managing the 
federal trust responsibility of the federal government to Indians and tribal resources. 
 17. What We Manage, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/about/what-we-
manage/national (last visited Aug. 24, 2017).  
 18. Statement of Neil Korzne, Director, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department 
of the Interior (Mar. 23, 2016), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ 
Kornze-BLM-Statement-3-23-Oil-and-Gas-Leasing.pdf (delivered at Recent Management of 
Oil and Gas Lease Sales by the Bureau of Land Management: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (2016)).  
 19. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 
U.S.C.) 
 20. Id. § 12, 24 Stat. at 383. 
 21. Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 
U.S.C.) 
 22. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Rate Regulation and Antitrust Immunity in 
Transportation:  The Genesis and Evolution of This Endangered Species, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 
335, 339-50 (1983) (discussing discriminatory “rate wars” prior to the formation of the ICC, 
and the ICC’s authority to set rate schedules).  
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recognizing that energy markets require oversight and regulation because of 
their broad effects on unrelated sectors of the national economy. The ICC 
was ultimately abolished in 1995, and much of its authority transferred to 
the newly created Surface Transportation Board within the Department of 
Transportation.
23
 However, the ICC’s regulatory authority over oil pipelines 
transferred to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which regulates 
energy transmission rates across the national grid.
24
 
The regulation of energy itself, rather than energy-producing 
commodities, began in 1920 with the passage of the Federal Water Power 
Act (FWPA), which created the Federal Power Commission (FPC).
25
 The 
FPC was initially primarily responsible for licensing hydroelectric dam 
development.
26
 However, the 1935 amendments to the FWPA, known as 
the Federal Power Act (FPA),
27
 expanded the FPC’s regulatory authority to 
include wholesale rates and transmission rates of electric energy across 
state lines.
28
 In 1938, the Natural Gas Act (NGA) gave the FPC regulatory 
authority over transportation of natural gas across state lines, as well as 
regulatory authority over wholesales of natural gas.
29
 The FPC 
subsequently expanded this authority through a series of cases—Federal 
Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
30
 Federal Power 
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
31




When the FPC set rates for the wholesale natural gas sales of the Natural 
Gas Pipeline Company (NPC), the NPC argued in Natural Gas Pipeline Co. 
that it was not subject to the FPC ratemaking authority because its business 
model did not constitute interstate commerce.
33
 The NPC produced and 
purchased natural gas at its facilities in Texas, and transferred this gas via 
pipelines, which it wholly owned, to other wholly owned facilities in 
                                                                                                                 
 23. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803. 
 24. Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. 
Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 980 (2015). 
 25. Ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823 
(2012)). 
 26. Id. § 4, 41 Stat. at 1065-67. 
 27. Ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803, 838 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828 
(2012)) (title II of the Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Ch. 556, § 1, 52 Stat. 821, 821 (codified as amended at 515 U.S.C. § 717 (2012)). 
 30. 315 U.S. 575 (1942). 
 31. 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
 32. 47 U.S. 672 (1954). 
 33. 315 U.S. at 581-82. 
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 Although the NPC ultimately sold the natural gas wholesale to 
Illinois utilities for retail resale to customers, the NPC argued that this was 
an intrastate transaction, and that the state should regulate it rather than the 
FPC.
35
 The Court held that even though the FPC’s rate would cost the NPC 
significant revenue, the rate was constitutional as long as the ratemaking 
process involved two steps. First, the adjustment of the rate must allow for 
a fair revenue return to the company, even if not the most profitable 
return.
36
 Second, the rate schedule providing for the fair return must 
eliminate discrimination and unfairness from the market.
37
 The Court 
reached this two-step process after analogically reasoning that the ICC was 
granted similar ratemaking authority under the Transportation Act of 
1920,
38
 upon which part of the NGA was modeled.
39
 
When the FPC set rates for wholesale natural gas sales at a level below 
the profit margins of Hope Natural Gas Company (HNCP), the HNCP 
argued in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. that the 
calculations used by the FPC did not properly account for the HNCP’s fixed 
costs and operating costs because the FPC’s calculations used an 
accelerated depreciation schedule.
40
 In its holding, the Court expanded upon 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. and held that the FPC is not required to use any 
particular formula in setting rates.
41
 Rather, it is only required to ensure that 
the result of its rate setting is just and reasonable.
42
 Moreover, courts should 
defer to the agency’s determination of just and reasonableness, which 




Subsequently, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, the FPC obtained 
regulatory authority to set rates for natural gas sales that occurred in-state, 
if that natural gas was bound for transmission and resale outside state 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. at 578-79. 
 35. Id. at 583. 
 36. Id. at 584. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456. 
 39. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. at 584. 
 40. 320 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1944). 
 41. Id. at 602. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (“[T]he Commission's order does not become suspect by reason of the fact that it 
is challenged. It is the product of expert judgment which carries a presumption of validity. 
And he who would upset the rate order under the Act carries the heavy burden of making a 
convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its 
consequences.”). 
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 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin is interesting because the FPC 
initially determined that an independent producer of natural gas did not fall 
within the FPC’s ratemaking jurisdiction under the NGA, because the sale 
of natural gas occurred only as part of the production and gathering of 
natural gas—activities which the FPC's jurisdiction does not encompass  
under the NGA.
45
 However, the Supreme Court reasoned that if these sales 
were not subject to federal regulation, then they must be regulated by the 
state, which would create an unworkable patchwork of state-by-state 
regulation—something the NGA expressly sought to eliminate.
46
 The Court 
also seemed concerned with the fact that Phillips Petroleum Company 
produced over 50% of the gas purchased by other companies at the point of 
sale.
47
 Given the fact that the FPC found that it did not have jurisdiction 
over Phillips’ activities, an underlying issue in this holding is the Court’s 
concern over creating an institutionalized energy black market where 
federal jurisdiction could not reach. 
The result of these holdings is that federal regulatory authority over 
energy markets is exclusive with regards to energy sales in interstate 
commerce, even if this regulatory authority significantly affects, or even 
negatively affects, the regulated energy producers. Moreover, this 
regulatory authority attaches even before the energy crosses state lines as 
long as the energy is bound for interstate commerce. Although these 
holdings may seem obvious to scholars today, it is important to note that 
this regulatory regime was developed in the years following the Great 
Depression, during World War II, and the Cold War, when national 
interests required strong federal oversight to ensure a stable market and 
economy. Energy regulation during this period is almost inherently viewed 
as an economic endeavor. Although this is still true today, the outlook 
concerning energy regulation broadened in the 1970s to include a national 
security component as well. 
As it relates to the field of Indian law, the synthesis of these holdings 
underscores the fact that Congress and the Supreme Court seem to be in 
agreement that state authority is inadequate to provide a stable regulatory 
regime in the areas of energy law and Indian law. In the series of cases 
known as the “Marshall Trilogy,” for instance, the Supreme Court laid the 
foundation for congressional plenary power over Indian affairs by holding 
that Indian tribal governments have legitimate jurisdictional authority over 
                                                                                                                 
 44. 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954). 
 45. Id. at 676-77. 
 46. Id. at 681. 
 47. Id. at 675. 
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tribal matters arising on tribal lands, but that tribal reservations are neither 
above nor co-equal with states—rather, the relationship between Indians 
and Indian reservations to the United States federal government is one of 
hierarchy.
48
 Indian tribal governments are independent, but only insofar as 
Congress allows them to be.
49
 Once Congress chooses to redefine this 
relationship (either for the better or the worse from the Indians’ 
perspective), then it can exercise its plenary power even against the Indians’ 
wishes.
50
 Indians can invoke the trust relationship as a shield to undesirable 
action, but success in this regard requires the Supreme Court to hold that 
the tribes have a greater interest in the trust relationship than Congress has 
in its plenary power. 
B. Energy Regulation in the Modern Era 
The most dramatic shift in national energy policy came in 1973 in the 
wake of an oil embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). In response to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, 
OPEC nations undertook two concurrent courses of action to pressure the 
United States and its allies to withdraw their support from Israel in the Yom 
Kippur War.
51
 First, OPEC nations mutually agreed to a 5% reduction in 
their oil production in order to inflate the price per barrel of oil in the world 
market.
52
 Second, OPEC instituted a series of embargoes on the United 
States and other Western nations who supported the United States or 
Israel.
53
 Because the United States was highly dependent upon foreign oil, 
the embargo thrust the United States into a state of crisis both economically 
and geopolitically.
54
 In addition to short-term solutions
55
 the United States 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). 
 49. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832). 
 50. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-77 (1823) (discussing federal 
authority over Indians through the doctrines of discovery and conquest). 
 51. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER 586-89 
(1993). 
 52. Id. at 607. 
 53. Id. at 607-08. 
 54. Id. at 606-09. 
 55. The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 
627, compelled President Nixon to promulgate regulations to control the price of petroleum. 
See id. § 2(b), 87 Stat. at 628. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 
94-163, 89 Stat. 871, created the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which has the capacity to hold 
as much as 713.5 million barrels of oil. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
https://energy.gov/fe/services/petroleum-reserves/strategic-petroleum-reserve (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2017).  
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also undertook long-term policy shifts, which included energy efficiency 
measures, fuel economy standards, and a ban on U.S. oil exports.
56
 
The most significant effect of the embargo was the large-scale 
reorganization of U.S. energy agencies and policies. First, Congress passed 
the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974
57
 which created the Federal 
Energy Administration (FEA). The FEA was created to “promote the 
expansion of readily usable energy sources, and to assist in developing 
policies and plans to meet the energy needs of the Nation.”
58
 However, the 
FEA was superseded by the Department of Energy (DOE) in 1977 with the 
passage of the Department of Energy Organization Act.
59
 The Department 
of Energy Act reorganized and consolidated the FEA and the FPC into the 
new DOE.
60
 The Department of Energy Act also created two independent 
sub-agencies within the DOE: the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), which is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating 
energy data and information,
61
 and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC),
62
 which assumed the powers vested in the FPC to 
regulate interstate energy sales and set rates for wholesale energy sales.
63
 
The last significant statute in response to the OPEC oil embargo was the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).
64
 PURPA was 
enacted to promote energy conservation and efficiency, and to promote 
domestic energy production. 
65
 PURPA expanded the FERC’s authority to 
include not just large-scale public utilities, but also small-scale “qualifying 
facilities”
66
 that traditionally faced discriminatory treatment in their energy 
sales to the grid.
 
PURPA represents a small but significant shift in national 
energy policy away from a bigger-is-better model toward a recognition that 
small and distributed energy generating units (EGUs) can fill a niche in the 
national energy policy to both increase availability and reliability of energy, 
and to help depress energy prices, especially in underserved markets with 
low access to energy. Prior to PURPA’s enactment, utilities were scaling 
back their development of large EGUs because the OPEC oil embargo 
                                                                                                                 
 56. 89 Stat. 871. 
 57. Pub. L. No. 93–275, 88 Stat. 96. 
 58. Id. § 2, 88 Stat. at 97 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 761(a) (2012)). 
 59. Pub. L. No. 95–91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977). 
 60. Id. § 301, 91 Stat. at 577-78 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7151 (2012)). 
 61. Id. § 205, 91 Stat. at 572 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7135(a)). 
 62. Id. § 401, 91 Stat. at 582 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7171(a)). 
 63. See supra notes 25-47 and accompanying text. 
 64. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117. 
 65. Id. § 2, 92 Stat. at 3119. 
 66. Id. § 201, 92 Stat. at 3134. 
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drove the costs of fuel higher, which not only affected the economics of 
energy sales, but also inflated the costs of expanding and maintaining EGUs 
and transmission lines.
67
 PURPA addressed this by requiring “wheeling”
68
 
by transmission operators so that the small-scale EGUs could enter the 
market.
69
 This was intended to achieve two results: (1) eliminate 
discriminatory pricing by transmission providers who gave preference to 
large-scale EGUs over small-scale EGUs to achieve the ultimate goal of 
increasing competition in an effort to decrease prices paid by consumers, 




Eventually, as larger numbers of people became connected to long-range 
interstate electrical grids, U.S. energy policy developed to regulate the 
transmission of energy itself in addition to the extraction and transportation 
of energy-generating commodities. It was not until a geopolitically 
manufactured energy crisis in the 1970s that the United States began to 
regulate energy usage through mechanisms such as mandated energy 
efficiency measures. Increases in energy use, coupled with increases in 
energy efficiency, have allowed large segments of the population to become 
connected to the electrical grid—arguably one of the greatest national 
achievements of the last century. However, energy policy in the United 
States still generally focuses on large-scale development of centralized 
power stations connected to interstate transmission lines.
71
 The trouble with 
this model is that it favors fossil fuel development, which generally is 
falling out of favor among a majority of U.S. citizens.
72
 Moreover, this 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 223-24 n.12 (1983). 
 68. “Wheeling” is the transfer of electrical power through transmission and distribution 
lines from a small-scale qualifying facility to a utility. Wheeling, INDEP. ENERGY PRODUCERS 
ASS’N, http://www.iepa.com/wheeling.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2017). Wheeling is designed 
to move the least-cost power to consumers in order to keep costs low. Id. 
 69. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, §§ 203-204, 92 Stat. at 3136-40. 
 70. Rudy Perkins, Note, Electricity Deregulation, Environmental Externalities and the 
Limitations of Price, 39 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1004-05 (1998) (discussing PURPA’s wheeling 
requirement at the marginal cost rate of transmitting utilities). 
 71. See Frequently Asked Questions: What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy 
Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 
(last visited July 30, 2017) (stating that 85% of U.S. electricity is generated by utility-scale 
facilities). 
 72. See Meg Handley, Poll: Americans Overwhelmingly Support Alternative Energy, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/ 
2013/04/01/poll-americans-overwhelmingly-support-alternative-energy; Brendan Moore & 
Stafford Nichols, Americans Still Favor Energy Conservation over Production, GALLUP 
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model is woefully inadequate to address large areas of Indian Country, 
which have no access to the national electrical grid.
73
  
The field of energy law can no longer be defined in terms of resource 
extraction and energy generation alone. Rather, the future of energy law 
must address a unique nexus between commodity and commerce law, along 
with environmental and human rights law. Just as the United States has 
transitioned from a renewable energy economy in the late 1700s and early 
1800s to a fossil fuel economy in the mid-1800s, the United States is now 
refocusing on renewable energy as a vital component of its overall energy 
policy.
74
 This focus is largely a reaction to the negative effects of climate 
change, as well as a slow realization that energy security is a national 
security issue,
75
 not just an economic security issue. The effects this 
realization will have on renewable energy development and grid 
connectivity in Indian Country remains to be seen. However, there are 
promising signs that Congress understands the renewable energy 
development opportunities in Indian Country, and is willing to work with 
tribes to promote such development in ways that are mutually beneficial to 
both the tribes and the United States’ population as a whole.
76
 
C. Modern Energy Policy, and Its Effect on Renewable Energy 
Development in Indian Country 
Providing energy access to rural and isolated areas of Indian Country via 
power lines is prohibitively expensive
77
 when considering the small number 
of citizens who would benefit from this investment. As such, the traditional 
energy model of a large centralized power production facility connected to 
                                                                                                                 
(Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/168176/americans-favor-energy-conservation-
production.aspx; Jeff McMahon, Americans Want America to Run on Solar and Wind, 
FORBES (Jan. 1, 2015, 9:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2015/01/01/ 
americans-want-america-to-run-on-solar-and-wind/#6c606a1b3699; Zac Auter, In U.S., 73% 
Now Prioritize Alternative Energy over Oil, Gas, GALLUP (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www. 
gallup.com/poll/190268/prioritize-alternative-energy-oil-gas.aspx. 
 73. Laurie Guevara-Stone, How Some Native Americans Are Embracing Renewable 
Energy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 1, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/ 
Energy-Voices/2014/0701/How-some-Native-Americans-are-embracing-renewable-energy. 
 74. See supra note 9. 
 75. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., STRATEGIC SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE PLAN: FY 2012, 
at ES-1 (2012), http://perma.cc/E8QS-KVJ6. 
 76. See infra Part III.  
 77. See, e.g., PETER MEISEN, GLOB. ENERGY NETWORK INST., RENEWABLE ENERGY ON 
TRIBAL LANDS 7 (2009) http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/research/renewable-energy-on-
tribal-lands/Renewable-Energy-on-Tribal-Lands.pdf (“[P]ower lines . . . can cost approxima-
tely $60,000 per mile in mountainous terrain.”). 
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homes through long transmission lines and localized distribution centers is 
not well suited for the geographic and economic realities of rural Indian 
Country. 
One alternative to increase access to energy in rural and isolated areas of 
Indian Country is to utilize renewable energy technologies that can be both 
scalable with regards to utility-sized facilities (i.e., built in parts over time 
as demand rises in order to keep costs low), as well as distributed with 
regards to household-sized technologies (i.e., the technology used is not 
necessarily connected to the grid, but is instead intended to provide energy 
to the end-user who owns the technology). In many ways, renewable energy 
development is particularly well-suited for Indian Country since Indian 
Country “contains an estimated 5% of all renewable energy resources” in 
the United States, including 14 billion MWh of solar resources and 1100 
million MWh of wind resources.
78
 The presence of such abundant 
renewable energy resources begs the question of why access to energy in 
Indian Country is so low. The answer to this question requires a two-part 
analysis. The first section of this part will discuss the continuing effects 
from the Allotment era, including the effects of court holdings which 
diminish tribal sovereignty over rights-of-way through Indian Country. The 
second section will discuss current renewable energy economic incentives, 
including state-driven policies, utility rebate programs, and federal tax 
incentives for renewable energy development. 
1. The Continuing Effects of Allotment on Rights-of-Way Over Indian 
Country 
Transmitting energy across the United States is a legally complex task. 
Although states retain regulatory authority over transmission siting and 
retail sales within their borders, federal regulators have regulatory authority 
over interstate transmission, as well as over wholesale rates.
79
 In Indian 
Country, state regulatory authority often applies only minimally, if at all, 
since tribes retain sovereignty and jurisdiction over their own lands.
80
 
                                                                                                                 
 78. OFFICE OF INDIAN ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DEVELOPING CLEAN ENERGY 
PROJECTS ON TRIBAL LANDS: DATA AND RESOURCES FOR TRIBES 3 (Dec. 2012). 
 79. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION STUDY 5-8 (2011), 
https://www3.epa.gov/airtoxics/utility/puc_study_march2011.pdf (providing an overview of 
the core responsibilities and basic structure of the major regulatory agencies overseeing the 
electric sector). 
 80. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 520 (1832) (“The Cherokee Nation . . . 
[occupies] its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of 
Georgia can have no force . . . .”). But see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) 
(“Indians' right to make their own laws and be governed by them does not exclude all state 
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However, tribal sovereignty is not absolute, and must yield to federal 
oversight with regards to lands held in trust by the federal government.
81
 An 
additional layer of complexity exists regarding tribal grants of rights-of-
way (ROWs) through Indian Country due to the fact that the ROW may not 
just involve tribally owned land or land held in fee simple by individual 
Indians, but may also involve Indian Country land that is owned in fee 
simple by non-Indians or non-tribal members due to the federal Indian 
policy known as allotment. 
In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act.
82
 The Act divided 
reservation land into 160-acre plots that were distributed to the heads of 
each family, but held in trust, tax-free, by the government for a period of 
twenty-five years.
83
 At the end of this period, the title would be conveyed to 
the family head in fee simple and subject to state taxation.
84
 Any remaining 
reservation land was then parceled and sold to non-Indian settlers.
85
 The 
proceeds from these sales were given to the Indian tribe.
86
 
Although the goal of allotment was intended to assimilate Indians by 
discouraging tribalism and encouraging capitalism through privately owned 
farms, the detrimental effects of allotment have been long-lasting for both 
individual Indians and tribal governments. Many individual Indians lost 
their allotted land after the twenty-five-year period because they could not 
afford the tax payments.
87
 As these parcels were conveyed to non-Indian 
farmers through forced sales, the remaining Indian landowners could not 
compete financially with non-Indian farmers whose farms grew through 
consolidated land purchases.
88
 Many of these Indians were forced to sell 
their land under terms and at prices that were financially detrimental.
89
 
                                                                                                                 
regulatory authority on the reservation. State sovereignty does not end at a reservation's 
border.”). 
 81. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04(4), at 418-23 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the federal trust doctrine). 
 82. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.) (also 
known as the Dawes Act). Senator Henry Laurens Dawes (R-Mass.), chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs, authored and sponsored the bill. 
 83. Id. § 5, 24 Stat. at 389. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 12 (1995) 
(“[M]any [Indians] lost their lands at sheriffs' sales for nonpayment of taxes or other liens.”). 
 88. Id. at 12-13 
 89. Id. at 12. 
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Tribal governments continue to struggle with the effects of allotment 
today. Because of these forced sales, non-tribal members hold many parcels 
of land within the boundaries of Indian reservations in fee simple.
90
 This 
raises complex jurisdictional questions as to whether the tribe, the state, or 
the federal government has jurisdiction over certain issues in Indian 
Country. The best that can be said of these dynamics is that jurisdiction in 
Indian law cases often depends not only on where the controversy occurs, 
but also on who the parties are and their relationship to each other.
91
 
The “checker boarding” of land ownership and jurisdiction throughout 
Indian Country has direct effects on Indian development, especially with 
regards to the development of Indian energy resources. Determining who 
has the right to the energy resource, what state or federal agency has 
regulatory authority, and how development subsidies (if any) should be 
applied adds significant hurdles—both economic and jurisdictional—to the 
development of energy resources. This is especially true of renewable 
energy resources due to the complexities it adds with regards to ROWs over 
Indian Country. 
The regulatory background concerning ROWs over Indian Country is 
more favorable to Indians today than it has historically been. Prior to 1899, 
Congress authorized ROWs by enacting a specific statute for each 
individual ROW.
92
 During this time, Congress generally required the entity 
seeking the ROW over Indian Country to pay just compensation at a cost 
determined by the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary).
93
 The trouble with 
this model, aside from being extremely inefficient, was that the Secretary 
was not always required to consult with the tribe as to its wishes regarding a 
ROW.
94
 This changed when Congress passed the Indian Right-of-Way Act 
of 1948, which allowed the Secretary to grant ROWs over Indian Country 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See Jurisdictional Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th 
Cong. 2 (1998) (statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs) (stating that twenty-seven tribes in the Seattle area have more land owned by 
non-Indians within tribal reservation boundaries than owned by tribal members). 
 91. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 81, § 7.02 (discussing 
tribal jurisdiction).   
 92. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY & U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005, 
SECTION 1813 INDIAN LAND RIGHTS-OF-WAY STUDY 30 (2007), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/ 
files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/EPAct_1813_Final.pdf [hereinafter ENERGY POLICY ACT 
STUDY]. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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for any company that complied with the terms of the authorizing statute.
95
 
The Secretary had already obtained the general authority to grant ROWs 
over Indian Country through a series of previously enacted statutes.
96
 
However, none of these statutes required tribal consultation or consent. The 
Indian Right-of-Way Act of 1948 made consultation and consent 
obligatory, as well as streamlined the ROW process by stipulating the 
actions a company must take to obtain a ROW, thereby removing much of 
the discretionary nature of this duty from the Secretary.
97
 
Although it may be tempting to assume that tribes typically take a “not in 
my backyard” approach to transmission infrastructure and ROWs in Indian 
Country, this is not necessarily true.
98
 In some instances, tribes may be 
eager to negotiate ROWs through their reservations because they see this as 
a lucrative revenue stream.
99
 However, the issue of cost valuation may 
drive-up the costs of ROWs over Indian Country, or may deter tribal 
governments from granting ROWs altogether due to differing valuation 
calculations between tribal governments and ROW seekers. 
In general, payment for ROWs can either be on a per unit of usage basis 
(i.e., per square foot or per acre), or by an objective appraisal of the affected 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Indian Right-of-Way Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-407, 62 Stat. 17 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 323–328). 
 96. See General Rights-of-Way, ch. 374, 30 Stat. 990, 990 (1899) (“[A] right of way . . .  
for a railway, telegraph and telephone line through any Indian reservation in any State or 
Territory. . . is hereby granted to any railroad company organized under the laws of the 
United States . . . .“); 25 U.S.C. § 321 (2012) (“The Secretary of the Interior is authorized 
and empowered to grant a right-of-way in the nature of an easement for the construction, 
operation, and maintenance of pipe lines for the conveyance of oil and gas through any 
Indian reservation . . . .”); 43 U.S.C.A. § 961 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-22) 
(“[T]he head of the department having jurisdiction over the lands be, and he hereby is, 
authorized and empowered, under general regulations to be fixed by him, to grant an 
easement for rights-of-way . . . for electrical poles and lines for the transmission and 
distribution of electrical power, and for poles and lines for communication purposes . . . .”). 
 97. 25 U.S.C. § 324 (2012) (“No grant of a right-of-way over and across any lands 
belonging to a tribe organized under [the Indian Reorganization Act et al.] shall be made 
without the consent of the proper tribal officials.”). 
 98. See Ezra Rosser, Ahistorical Indians and Reservation Resources, 40 ENVTL. L. 437, 
466 (2010) (arguing that the stereotype that Indians are inherently environmentalists is a 
“mental shortcut” that may be “grounded on some element of truth,” but that does not 
necessarily hold true for all tribes). 
 99. See generally James C. Powers, Will Rights of Way Across Indian Land Drive Up the 
Cost of Energy?, RIGHT OF WAY MAG., Mar./Apr. 2006, https://www.irwaonline.org/ 
eweb/upload/ROW%20Archives%207-05%20thru%207-06/306/indianland.pdf (warning that 
Indian tribes’ negotiations regarding rights-of-way may drive up energy prices). 
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 Although the per unit calculation seems to be more 
objective, the trouble with this calculation is that determining the value of a 
unit of land isolated from its larger parcel may be difficult. For instance, the 
ROW seeker may prefer to calculate the value of the unit at its pre-
development or current use value, whereas the tribe may prefer to calculate 
the value of the unit at its post-development value since this development 
will likely alter the value of the surrounding parcel. The appraisal method is 
equally troublesome because the tribe may prefer to appraise the land as if 
the entire ROW were one continuous parcel since this appraisal 
methodology more appropriately captures the value of the entire project. 
However, the ROW seeker may prefer to appraise the land on a parcel-to-
parcel basis, since this valuation methodology is more likely to result in a 
lower price paid to each individual landowner. 
Currently, there is no standard value calculation for ROWs over Indian 
Country. Rather, each ROW is granted based on negotiations between the 
ROW seeker and the tribal government or landowner.
101
 Tribes argue that a 
standard value calculation could not account for the value of things like 
tribal history, culture, or oral traditions that are tied to tribal lands.
102
 
Moreover, certain areas of tribal lands may be specific to certain tribal 
practices, or may be the only area where certain biota necessary for 
religious practices can be found.
103
 ROWs seekers, however, argue that 
market-based valuations should apply to tribal lands because allowing a 
tribe to negotiate a ROW under its own terms drives costs to the highest 
point that the ROW seeker must bear.
104
 ROW seekers argue that this 




Tribal governments may be justifiably concerned about granting ROWs 
through Indian Country without obtaining adequate compensation because 
ROWs may impede upon the tribe’s inherent sovereignty or tribal 
jurisdiction.
106
 Although tribes generally have civil jurisdiction over events 
                                                                                                                 
 100. See ENERGY POLICY ACT STUDY, supra note 92, at 55-74 (section 9, summarizing 
various compensation arrangements for rights of way in Indian Country). 
 101. Id. at 30. 
 102. Id. at 30-31. 
 103. Id. at 31. 
 104. Id. at 29-30. 
 105. Id. at 39. 
 106. See Comments of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe on the Department of Energy 
Section 1813 Right-of-Way Study, TRIBAL ENERGY & ENVTL. INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, ¶ 6 (Apr. 
18, 2006), http://teeic.indianaffairs.gov/er/transmission/case/1813/docs/may2006/Comments_ 
Right_of_Way_Study_Res_%20No_166_06_CR.pdf (“No right of way or other business 
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occurring in Indian Country,
107
 “including rights-of-way running through 
the reservation,”
108
 courts have not always agreed that tribal jurisdiction 
exists where ROWs grant access to non-Indians or non-Indian interests. 
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, a case involving a car accident between two 
non-Indians on a state highway in Indian Country, the Supreme Court held 
that tribal civil jurisdiction did not extend to disputes between two non-
Indians, even though the dispute arose from an incident that took place 
wholly in Indian Country on land owned in fee simple by the Three 
Affiliated Tribes.
109
 This holding is based on three points of reasoning. 
First, the Court reasoned that both of the conditions under 25 U.S.C. §§ 
324-325 requiring consent of tribal officials and a payment of just 
compensation were fully met;
110
 therefore, the Tribe invited non-tribal 
members onto its reservation by granting a proper ROW. Second, the Court 
noted that a federally granted ROW provided for the state highway on 
which the accident occurred.
111
 Since the purpose of the highway was to 
bring non-tribal members onto the Indian land and the highway was 
maintained by the state, the Tribe had no jurisdiction over non-member 
disputes arising from accidents thereon, even though the Tribe owned the 
land providing for the ROW.
112
 Finally, the Court noted that when granting 
the ROW, the Tribe reserved its rights to construct crossings over the 
ROW, and that these crossings were to be maintained by individual 
landowners whose land abutted the crossings.
113
 Since the Tribe reserved 
these rights when the ROW was granted, but did not reserve any tribal 
jurisdiction over the ROW, then the Tribe ceded jurisdictional control over 
disputes arising from events occurring on the ROW.
114
 
Although 25 U.S.C. § 324 requires consent of tribal officials and just 
compensation to obtain a proper ROW over Indian land owned in fee 
simple, the DOI may grant ROWs over lands held in trust for Indian tribes. 
In Blackfeet Indian Tribe v. Montana Power Co., a case involving a natural 
gas pipeline that ran across Indian land held in trust, the Blackfeet Tribe 
                                                                                                                 
arrangement that allows non-tribal entities or persons to use tribal land should reduce the 
jurisdiction of the Tribe over its land or over persons and activities occurring on such lands.”). 
 107. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). 
 108. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
 109. 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997). 
 110. Id. at 454-55. 
 111. Id. at 442. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 455. 
 114. Id. 
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objected to a fifty-year lease issued by the Secretary for a pipeline ROW.
115
 
The Blackfeet Tribe argued that the Secretary’s authority under 25 U.S.C. § 
321 only permitted twenty-year lease terms for pipelines.
116
 The Ninth 
Circuit held that while § 321 only permitted twenty-year lease terms for 
pipelines, the Secretary had authority to issue fifty-year leases under 25 
U.S.C. § 323.
117
 Therefore, the Secretary was authorized to issue either 
twenty or fifty-year leases as he saw fit.
118
 
Although placing land in trust gives the Secretary the authority to grant 
ROWs, it protects the land from condemnation by state public utilities. In 
Nebraska Public Power District v. 100.95 Acres of Land, a case involving 
the authority of a public utility to condemn tracts of land held in trust by the 
United States for individual Indians and Indian tribes, the Eighth Circuit 
held that the utility had the authority under 25 U.S.C. § 357 to condemn 
allotted land held by Indians, but that § 357 does not authorize such 
authority regarding land held in trust for the Indians.
119
 Section 357 states 
that “[l]ands allotted in severalty to Indians may be condemned for any 
public purpose under the laws of the State or Territory where located in the 
same manner as land owned in fee may be condemned, and the money 
awarded as damages shall be paid to the allottee.”
120
 
The importance of these three holdings to energy development in Indian 
Country cannot be overstated because these holdings create a scenario 
where grants of ROWs through Indian Country imply a diminishment of 
tribal jurisdiction unless a tribe affirmatively reserves its jurisdiction in its 
ROW agreement. However, even if the tribe reserves its jurisdiction or 
refuses a ROW altogether, the land could still be condemned under state 
law as authorized by 25 U.S.C. § 357.
121
 Condemnation would overcome 
any reservation of tribal jurisdiction, but the mere possibility of 
condemnation may discourage Indians from negotiating too strongly in 
ROW agreements for fear that the ROW seeker will seek condemnation 
rather than a ROW agreement. If tribes or individual landowners choose, 
they can place fee simple land in trust with the federal government so that 
                                                                                                                 
 115. 838 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Section 323 states that the Secretary of the Interior “is empowered to grant rights-of-
way for all purposes, subject to such conditions as he may prescribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 323 
(2012). 
 118. Mont. Power Co., 838 F.2d at 1059. 
 119. 719 F.2d 956, 957 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 120. 25 U.S.C. § 357 (2012). 
 121. Id. 
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the federal trust obligation overcomes state condemnation. The Secretary 
then has the authority to issue ROWs under 25 U.S.C. § 323. Although the 
Secretary is required to act as trustee and consult with the tribe in ROW 
decisions, the fact that the ROW decision-making power is placed in a non-
tribal entity implies a diminishment of sovereignty, especially since the 
Secretary is only required to adhere to the landowner’s wishes “to the 




Even in light of these holdings, there may be greater opportunities to the 
tribe in ROW negotiations than tribal governments are utilizing. The most 
critical aspect of ROWs negotiations is their non-standard nature. There is 
no statute or regulation mandating that ROW seekers must use, or that 
tribes must consent to, market-based appraisals or valuations for ROWs. 
Tribes have correctly asserted that the freedom to negotiate is a function of 
their inherent sovereignty, and some tribes have not focused on maximizing 
payments for ROWs, but rather on utilizing more creative solutions. For 
instance, the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
accepted a $25,000 contribution to its scholarship fund in addition to 
monetary compensation for a natural gas pipeline ROW over its 
reservation.
123
 Rather than a one-time payment for the ROW itself, the 
Southern Ute tribe accepted a $15-per-rod
124
 donation to its tribal 
scholarship fund. Along with that donation, Southern Ute accepted various 
investment and joint-venture business opportunities from the Mid-
American Pipeline Company in exchange for a ROW for a liquefied natural 
gas pipeline spanning over seven miles of tribal land.
125
 In total, the 
scholarship payment reached approximately $50,000.
126
 
While remaining mindful of both the practical and the symbolic 
importance of sovereignty to Indian tribes, criticism is both warranted and 
appropriate if tribes forego energy development out of fear that ROWs 
required for that development may put their inherent sovereignty at risk. As 
discussed above, lack of access to energy in Indian Country is a significant 
impediment to income security, educational and employment opportunities, 
and the overall health and well-being of tribal members.
127
 To the extent 
that tribes are concerned about threats to their sovereignty or jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                 
 122. 25 C.F.R. § 169.124(b)-(c) (2016). 
 123. ENERGY POLICY ACT STUDY, supra note 92, at 57. 
 124. One rod is equal to five feet, six inches. 
 125. ENERGY POLICY ACT STUDY, supra note 92, at 58. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14. 
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stemming from ROWs over Indian Country, there is a federal work-around 




2. State-Driven Renewable Energy Development 
Although ROWs are necessary to provide grid-connected energy to 
Indian Country, the above discussion overlooks the fact that some areas of 
Indian Country either already have grid connectivity, or are geographically 
close enough to grid-connected areas to obtain grid connectivity without 
extensive new ROWs.
129
 Viewing grid-connected areas as separate from the 
problem of non-grid areas ignores two key facts. First, even though 
residents in grid-connected areas may have adequate access to energy, they 
might lack the economic resources to fully take advantage of this access.
130
 
Moreover, because of the exorbitant costs of extending the grid
131
 (which 
includes the costs associated with obtaining ROWs), even geographic 
proximity to grid-connected areas does not necessarily translate to grid-
connectivity per se.
132
 Second, viewing grid-connected areas as separate 
from non-grid areas considers access to energy in Indian Country as a 
geographic issue rather than a broader socioeconomic tribal issue.
133
 
A series of tax and utility rebate incentives encourage renewable energy 
development in the United States by decreasing the costs of investment, 
development, and operation over time. Utility-scale renewable energy 
development is largely driven by Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs), 
which are state programs that encourage or require utilities operating within 
the state to obtain a certain amount of their energy from renewable 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See infra Part III. 
 129. For the sake of simplicity, this Article will refer to areas with grid connectivity and 
areas capable of obtaining grid connectivity as “grid-connected” areas. Isolated areas 
without grid connectivity will be referred to as non-grid areas. 
 130. See generally PATRICK SABOL, FROM POWER TO EMPOWERMENT: PLUGGING LOW 
INCOME COMMUNITIES INTO THE CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY 1-2 (2016), https://grounds 
well.org/frompower_to_empowerment_wp.pdf (discussing the reasons why for poor 
Americans’ energy bills are higher than wealthy Americans’ and how these costs can 
snowball into unmanageable debt). 
 131. See MEISEN, supra note 77, at 7. 
 132. See id. at 19 (stating that higher energy costs on reservations hinders access to 
energy). 
 133. See generally id. 
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 Typically, RPSs operate on a yearly basis where the renewable 
energy target is raised over time to encourage development of renewable 
energy generating units (REGUs). The RPSs vary widely from state-to-
state.
135
 While some states make their RPSs mandatory and issue penalties 
for failure to comply, other states treat their RPSs as voluntary.
136
 
Utilities comply with the RPSs by obtaining renewable energy credits 
(RECs) for every unit of renewable energy they sell.
137
 States, however, 
define renewable energy sources differently. Thus, some states value solar 
energy more highly than wind energy, or classify waste-to-energy facilities 
as renewable energy sources whereas other states do not. For instance, 
Connecticut’s RPS program requires utilities by 2020 to generate 20% of 
their electricity from “Class I” facilities which exclude “trash-to-energy” 
facilities.
138
 By contrast, Maryland’s RPS requires 25% energy generation 
from “Tier 1 Renewable Sources” by 2020, which includes “waste-to-
energy” facilities.
139
 Consequently, prices vary widely between state REC 
markets and resource types.
140
 
Additionally, some states require the RECs to be “bundled” to the unit of 
renewable energy, while other states allow the RECs to be “unbundled” 
from the unit of renewable energy.
141
 Bundled RECs encourage renewable 
                                                                                                                 
 134. MEREDITH WINGATE ET AL., COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, FOSTERING 
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY MARKETS IN NORTH AMERICA 11-12 (2007), https://www.conser 
vationgateway.org/Documents/Fostering-RE-MarketsinNA-en.pdf. 
 135. Compare HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-92 (2015) (requiring 40% of each electric utility 
company’s net electricity sales to be from renewable sources by December 31, 2030), with 
IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-37-12 (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring that 10% of utility energy sales 
come from renewable energy sources to qualify for the financial incentives set out in the 
state’s renewable portfolio standard). 
 136. Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 
3, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850. 
 137. Renewable Energy Standards, SEIA: SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, http:// 
www.seia.org/policy/renewable-energy-deployment/renewable-energy-standards (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2017). 
 138. Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, DSIRE, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/ 
program/detail/1085http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/195 (last visited Aug. 
3, 2017). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Brook Detterman et al., United States, in ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE REGULATION 
194, 199 (Carlos de Miguel Perales et al. eds., 2015) (“According to the DOE’s Green 
Power Network, REC prices range from about US$1 (in Texas and Washington, DC) to 
about US$50 (in Massachusetts and several other states) [and] Solar RECs (SRECs) range 
from about US$50 to a high of nearly US$500.”). 
 141. U.S. P’SHIP FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FIN., RAMPING UP RENEWABLES: LEVERAGING 
STATE RPS PROGRAMS AMID UNCERTAIN FEDERAL SUPPORT 25 (2012), http://uspref.org/wp-
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energy generation close to the source of the energy usage, whereas 
unbundled RECs can be traded across state lines.
142
 Bundled RECs are 
preferable for states that want to encourage in-state development of REGUs 
whereas unbundled RECs are ideal for states where energy usage is much 
lower than energy supply.
143
 
Financial incentives for retail customers take the form of net metering or 
feed-in tariffs. Net metering and feed-in tariffs allow retail customers with 
small-scale grid-connected REGUs to sell the energy they generate to their 
utility.
144
 Although the programs are similar, there are slight differences 
between the two. 
Net metering, which is required under PURPA, allows a customer to sell 
the energy they generate to their utility at the retail price the customer 
would otherwise pay.
145
 In essence, net metering allows customers’ grid-
connected meters to flow backwards so that customers can either deduct the 
energy they generate from their utility bill, or credit this energy to future 
bills. Feed-in tariffs, however, require a pre-arranged purchase agreement 
with customers’ utilities which guarantee that the utility will purchase any 
energy generated by the customer at a price above the retail rate.
146
 
Although feed-in tariffs are financially ideal for customers because they 
guarantee a return on investment, only five states require feed-in tariffs, and 
only a small handful of utilities provide feed-in tariffs.
147
 
The trouble with net metering and feed-in tariffs, as they relate to Indian 
Country, is that both programs require grid connectivity in order to take 
advantage of the financial incentive of small-scale REGUs. As such, these 
programs provide no benefit to non-grid areas of Indian Country. In 
addition to net metering and feed-in tariffs, there are two federal tax 
                                                                                                                 
content/uploads/2012/06/Ramping-up-Renewables-Leveraging-State-RPS-Programs-amid-
Uncertain-Federal-Support-US-PREF-White-Paper1.pdf. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Cf. id. 
 144. Although net metering and feed-in tariffs can apply to energy generated from wind 
turbines as well as photovoltaic solar cells, most net metering and feed-in tariffs involve 
energy generated from photovoltaic solar cells since these are easy to deploy on residential 
and commercial rooftops as compared to the space required for a small-scale wind turbine. 
 145. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(11) (2012). 
 146. Feed-in Tariff: A Policy Tool Encouraging Deployment of Renewable Electricity 
Technologies, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (May 30, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayin 
energy/detail.cfm?id=11471. 
 147. Feed-in Tariffs and Similar Programs, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 4, 2013), 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/provider_programs.php. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss2/2
No. 2] ACCESS TO ENERGY IN INDIAN COUNTRY 303 
 
 
incentives for REGUs known as the Investment Tax Credit (ITC)
148
 and the 
Production Tax Credit (PTC)
149
 that provide additional incentives to 
develop REGUs. Like net metering and feed-in tariffs, the ITC and the PTC 
are similar, with some key differences. 
The ITC provides a phased-down rebate schedule whereby any 
individual or entity that pays federal income tax receives a 30% cost credit 
on their federal income tax for every dollar of investment they make in 
renewable energy projects once those projects come online.
150
 For solar 
projects, the 30% cost credit applies every year until 2019 as long as the 
solar cell has no less than a 500-watt capacity, and a 30% efficiency rate.
151
 
The credit drops to 26% in 2020, 22% in 2021, and 10% thereafter.
152
 
Investments in qualifying wind projects receive a 30% cost credit in 2016 
as long as the turbine has a minimum 100 kW capacity.
153
 This credit drops 
to 24% in 2017, 18% in 2018, and 12% in 2019.
154
 
The PTC provides a tax credit of $0.023/kWh for qualifying wind 
facilities and a credit of $0.012/kWh for other eligible REGUs, including 
solar cells.
155




With regards to encouraging REGU development in Indian Country, the 
PTC and the ITC suffer from several significant problems. First, because 
tribal governments are sovereign entities, they are not subject to federal 
taxation, and therefore do not qualify for federal tax breaks. Thus, any 
renewable energy project owned by the tribal government does not qualify 
for either the PTC or the ITC. Second, the PTC requires grid-connectivity 
since the credit only applies once the energy is “sold by the taxpayer to an 
unrelated person during the taxable year.”
157
 As such, the PTC does not 
incentivize REGU development in non-grid areas of Indian Country. Third, 
the PTC requires that the person or entity receiving the tax benefit owns the 
                                                                                                                 
 148. 26 U.S.C.A. § 48 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-22). 
 149. Id. § 45. 
 150. Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC), U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy. 
gov/savings/business-energy-investment-tax-credit-itc (last visited Mar. 8, 2017). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy. 
gov/savings/renewable-electricity-production-tax-credit-ptc (last visited Mar. 8, 2017). 
 156. Id. 
 157. 26 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(2)(B) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-22). 
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REGU, a dilemma that will be discussed below in Part III.
158
 Fourth, both 
programs require the taxpayer to have the capital upfront to spend on the 
REGU, or to have access to cost-effective financing to fund the REGU 
development.
159
 Due to economies of scale, this may be less of an issue for 




The incentives discussed above provide ample economic opportunities to 
individual Indian landowners in grid-connected areas since these 
landowners can utilize any of the tax or rebate programs to offset the costs 
of renewable energy development on their fee simple land. These 
opportunities are dependent upon the Indians’ ability to fund the upfront 
costs of investing in REGUs, which may not be possible for many Indians, 
even in grid-connected areas.
161
 Unfortunately, the economic incentives 
discussed above do not appreciably improve access to energy in non-grid 
areas of Indian Country since Indians in these areas must either pay for 
their own REGUs and rely upon the ITC to deflate this cost, or must obtain 




Rather than relying on individual Indian landowners to pay for their own 
distributed REGU technologies and take advantage of the tax and rebate 
incentives to improve access to energy, tribal governments can develop 
utility-scale renewable energy projects. Unlike individual landowners, 
however, tribal governments will not be eligible for the PTC because tribal 
governments are not subject to federal income tax.
163
 Although the inability 
to claim federal renewable energy tax credits hinders tribal renewable 
energy development, it is important to note that this, in and of itself, does 
not put tribes at a disadvantage compared to other sovereigns since 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Id. § 45(d). 
 159. See Barriers to Renewable Energy Technologies, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/increase-renewables/barriers-
to-renewable-energy.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2017). 
 160. Id. This same issue also affects grid-connected property owners who wish to take 
advantage of the ITC, net metering, or feed-in tariff programs. 
 161. Notably, this problem is not indicative to Indian landowners. Purchasing and 
deploying REGUs is a substantial cost that hinders REGU development throughout the 
United States. 
 162. See infra Section IV.A.  
 163. Income Tax Guidelines FAQ #6 Answer: Are Federal Recognized Tribes Subject to 
Income Taxes?, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/indian-
tribal-governments/itg-faq-6-answer-are-federally-recognized-tribes-subject-to-income-taxes 
(last visited Aug. 8, 2017). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss2/2
No. 2] ACCESS TO ENERGY IN INDIAN COUNTRY 305 
 
 
renewable energy development is commonly undertaken by private 
investors as opposed to being state-owned and operated.
164
 Thus, although 
tribal governments cannot take advantage of the PTC or the ITC, neither 
can state governments. 
Needless to say, tax and rebate incentives are critically important to the 
development of REGUs in the United States. These programs have driven 
much of the renewable energy development that has occurred in the last 
decade and will continue to be a driving force in making renewable energy 
cost-competitive with fossil fuels. Unfortunately, those Indians in the 
greatest need of expanded access to energy cannot afford the upfront 
investment costs for the REGU technologies, so the tax and rebate 
incentives are too little too late to benefit them. With an abundance of 
renewable energy resources in Indian Country, combined with low access 
to energy among Indian populations, the need for Indian-specific tax and 
rebate programs is clear. These programs would not only be beneficial to 
Indian populations, but non-Indian populations would also benefit from 
renewable energy generation that does not increase pollution in the 
biosphere. In essence, Indian-specific tax or rebate programs would not be a 
windfall to Indians at the expense of non-Indians. Rather, such programs 
would recognize the need for access to energy in Indian Country while at 
the same time creating a positive benefit to non-Indians as well. 
III. Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: A Solution Wrapped in a Problem 
A. Introduction and Overview 
In 2005, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act (EPAct), which, among 
other things, contained provisions intended to promote energy extraction 
and development in Indian Country.
165
 Title V of the EPAct is known as the 
Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act 
(ITEDSA).
166
 Prior to the ITEDSA’s enactment, tribal energy development 
projects were regulated under any number of statutes, such as the Indian 
                                                                                                                 
 164. See Daniel Gross, Going Private: To Undertake a Massively Ambitious Energy 




_funding.html (stating that private companies routinely back large-scale renewable energy 
projects on their own). 
 165. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594. 
 166. Id. tit. V, 119 Stat. at 763-79. 
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Mineral Leasing Act, or the Indian Mineral Development Act.
167
 There are 
two main problems with this regulatory structure: (1) sometimes two or 
more different statutes can regulate the same resource on tribal lands, 
therefore, determining which statute is the most beneficial to the tribal 
interests is costly, time consuming, and difficult; (2) regardless of the 
statute the tribe chooses to invoke for regulating the resource development, 
the tribes are required to seek development approval from the Secretary for 
all projects on lands held in trust by the federal government. 
The ITEDSA creates a mechanism through which tribes can escape DOI 
oversight and enter into long-term leases or ROW agreements for energy 
development under what is known as a Tribal Energy Resource Agreement 
(TERA).
168
 However, the process of creating a TERA and gaining 
Secretarial approval for projects under the TERA is, itself, costly, time-
consuming, and difficult.
169
 If the tribe meets certain statutory mandates, 
then the Secretary is obligated to approve the TERA and release the tribe 
from federal oversight regarding all actions under the TERA.
170
 In this 
regard, TERAs are similar to other statutory mechanisms designed to 
streamline or remove federal oversight.
171
 
TERAs address two of the problems outlined in Section II.A of this 
Article. First, by placing tribally owned land in trust, the state is precluded 
from condemning land for ROWs, but the tribe is still able to retain full 
control of issuing leases or ROWs over that land by entering into a TERA. 
TERAs prohibit the Secretary from approving leases or ROWs that the tribe 
does not agree with since the TERA grants the tribe lease-approving 
authority for the TERA resource.
172
 Because TERAs are only project-
specific, however, the Secretary still retains authority to issue ROWs over 
any trust land not subject to the TERA.
173
 To protect trust land from the 
possibility of ROWs, a tribe must create a development project that affects 
                                                                                                                 
 167. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text. 
 168. Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 503, § 2604(e), 119 Stat. at 770-76. 
 169. See Judith V. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian 
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065, 
1081-82 (2008) (discussing the process to obtain TERA approval). 
 170. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 503, § 2604(e)(2), 119 Stat. at 770. 
 171. For instance, section 404 of the Clean Water Act allows states, under their delegated 
authority, to issue general discharge permits rather than individual discharge permits that 
must comply with substantive criteria and an individualized application. 33 U.S.C. § 
1344(e)(1) (2012). The benefit of general permits is obvious—it decreases costs while 
promoting the efficient development of projects. 
 172. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 503, § 2604(a)-(b), 119 Stat. at 769-70. 
 173. 25 U.S.C. 323 (2012). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss2/2
No. 2] ACCESS TO ENERGY IN INDIAN COUNTRY 307 
 
 
that land and enter into a TERA for that project.
174
 Of course, this may run 
counter to what the tribe actually wants to do with the land it places in trust; 
perhaps a tribe may simply want to preserve the land as is. Therefore, 
TERAs, while beneficial to development, are not roadblocks to all federal 
oversight. For tribes that are focused on infrastructure development and 
must seek Secretarial approval frequently, a TERA provides the tribe more 
autonomy to pursue development in a self-actualizing manner. 
Third, TERAs affirm tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction since it is the 
tribal government that approves leases or ROWs for TERA projects rather 
than the DOI.
175
 The tribe would still be required to affirmatively assert its 
jurisdiction in the lease or ROW agreement with the non-tribal entity as per 
Strate.
176
 But, a TERA removes the federal middle-man in tribal 
development projects, at least insofar as the tribe assumes project oversight 
after the TERA is approved. TERAs also affirm tribal sovereignty in that 
the existence of a TERA may help a tribe assert its jurisdiction over 
disputes arising from a TERA project. Because TERAs exist under the 
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, TERAs are, by 
their very nature, an affirmation of tribal self-governance and self-
determination—an affirmation that the DOI has sanctioned and approved. 
Because energy development is an inherently economic activity, the tribe 
can argue that the DOI-approved TERA project is vital to the tribe’s 
economic vitality, thereby requiring tribal jurisdiction.
177
  
B. TERAs: The Solution 
As a matter of federal policy toward Indians and Indian tribal 
governments, TERAs represent Congress’ intent to shift away from 
                                                                                                                 
 174. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 503, § 2604(a)(2), 119 Stat. at 769. 
 175. Letter from Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation, to Sen. Ben Nighthorse 
Campbell 1 (Apr. 8, 2003), in Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act and the Native American 
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act: Hearing on S. 424 and S. 522 Before the 
S. Comm. on Indian Aff., 118th Cong. 108 (2003), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
108shrg86005/pdf/CHRG-108shrg86005.pdf ("Generally speaking, the concept of turning 
tribal resource management over to tribes while ‘eliminating' federal oversight would seem 
to be a very simple infusion of sovereignty into the current statutory and regulatory scheme 
governing tribal resource development. The Navajo Nation certainly supports this general 
concept."). 
 176. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text. 
 177. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (“A tribe may [] retain 
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands 
within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
308 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
 
 
paternalistic tribal development statutes toward a broader affirmation of 
tribal self-determination regarding Indian development projects. For 
example, the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA) allows a tribe to enter 
into leases with non-tribal entities for the extraction of minerals, as long as 
the Secretary approves the lease.
178
 Additionally, the Indian Mineral 
Development Act (IMDA) allows for both negotiated leases as under the 
IMLA, as well as joint venture agreements with non-tribal entities, subject 
also to Secretarial approval.
179
 The fact that federal paternalism permeates 
all Indian energy development statutes is a problem not just because it 
diminishes tribal sovereignty, but also because federal paternalism imposes 
an additional and costly layer of bureaucracy onto tribal development 
projects that often results in delays that cost tribal governments and non-
tribal investors time and money. In many ways, TERAs are an ideal 
solution to this bureaucracy.
180
 
One reason why TERAs are an ideal solution is that TERAs apply to all 
energy resource development,
181
 whereas previous energy development 
statutes are ambiguous as to whether or not they include development of 
renewable energy resources.
182
 Also, the term lengths for leases under a 
TERA are standardized at a maximum of thirty years for renewable 
development and ten years for oil and gas development.
183
 These terms are 
sufficiently lengthy for non-tribal developers to yield a return on 
investment. Furthermore, since the tribe, rather than the DOI, retains the 
right of renewal, TERAs encourage cooperation between the two parties, 
rather than communication through DOI officials. Perhaps most 
importantly, TERAs allow the tribe to assume an active role in energy 
development on its own lands, rather than acting merely as a passive lessor 
or seller.
184
 The ITEDSA regulations allow a tribe to enter into a “business 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. § 396a (2012). 
 179. Indian Mineral Development Act, Pub. L. No. 97-382, 96 Stat. 1938 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2012)). 
 180. See Royster, supra note 1, at 117-19 (discussing four ways in which TERAs address 
delays caused by the federal trust obligation). 
 181. 25 C.F.R. § 224.30 (2015) (“Energy Resources means both renewable and 
nonrenewable energy sources, including, but not limited to, natural gas, oil, uranium, coal, 
nuclear, wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, and hydrologic resources.”). 
 182. Royster, supra note 1, at 97 (noting that the Indian Mineral Development Act 
discusses oil, natural gas, uranium, coal, geothermal, and other energy or non-energy 
mineral resources (25 U.S.C. § 2102(a)), but that the statute does not clarify the breadth of 
the “other energy or non-energy mineral resources”). 
 183. Id. at 117. 
 184. Id. at 118. 
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agreement” for “any permit, contract, joint venture, option, or other 
agreement that furthers any activity related to locating, producing, 
transporting, or marketing energy resources on tribal land.”
185
 The breadth 
of this definition allows a tribe to enter into nearly any joint venture with a 
non-tribal entity as long as that joint venture is pursuant to energy 
development on tribal land. 
C. TERAs: The Problem 
Although TERAs, in theory, provide a solution to the jurisdictional 
issues affecting REGU development in Indian Country, in practice TERAs 
may actually impede REGU development in Indian Country. Before a tribe 
can enter into a TERA, the tribal government must meet the stringent 
mandates described in 25 C.F.R. § 224.63 in order to qualify for a TERA.
186
 
One of these mandates is a requirement that the tribe implement some type 
of tribal “environmental review process.”
187
 The environmental review 
process must identify all significant environmental effects of the project, 
identify mitigation measures, provide a public notice and comment period, 
and require a tribal response to substantive comments.
188
 
Notably, the tribal environmental review process does not supplant the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
189
 In fact, the environmental 
review process may actually be more stringent than the NEPA in two 
regards. First, many of the tribal environmental review requirements are 
duplicative of the NEPA, essentially requiring the tribe to undergo some 
parts of the NEPA process twice.
190
 Second, the NEPA and the tribal 
environmental review process apply equally to the tribe and actually place 
tribal sovereignty below state sovereignty in certain regards.
191
 For 
instance, if a state chooses to approve a wind farm, the state is not required 
                                                                                                                 
 185. 25 C.F.R. § 224.30(1) (2008). 
 186. 25 C.F.R. § 224.63 (2012). 
 187. Id. § 224.63(c). 
 188. Id. § 224.63(c)(1)-(4). 
 189. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(f)(1) (2012) (“Nothing in this section affects the application of . . . 
any Federal environmental law.”). 
 190. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: The Unintended "Great 
Mischief for Indian Energy Development" and the Resulting Need for Reform, 29 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 811, 817 (2012) (discussing the aspects of the tribal environmental review 
process that mirror NEPA).  
 191. Scot W. Anderson, The Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination 
Act of 2005: Opportunities for Cooperative Ventures 8-9 & n.36 (presentation at Special 
Institute: Natural Resource Development in Indian Country, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Institute, Nov. 10-11, 2005), https://www.dgslaw.com/images/materials/670412.pdf. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
310 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
 
 
to undergo a NEPA analysis unless there is some major federal action (i.e., 
federal grants, taking of endangered species, etc.). But, if a tribe chooses to 
develop a wind farm on trust land under a TERA, the tribe is immediately 
at a disadvantage compared to the state by triggering the NEPA by virtue of 
requiring Secretarial approval. The tribe is also placed at a further 
disadvantage by virtue of the tribal environmental review requirement 
under a TERA. 
The distinction between the tribal environmental review process under a 
TERA and the Environmental Assessment (EA) or Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) requirement under the NEPA is critical. The tribal 
environmental review process is a review of the TERA project itself (i.e., 
the proposed wind farm).
192
 That review does not occur until after the 
Secretary grants the TERA, but before development on the project can 
commence.
193
 The NEPA analysis, on the other hand, is required for any 
“major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.”
194
 The NEPA is triggered during the approval process of the 
TERA by the Secretary. Therefore, the NEPA would require the DOI to 
conduct an EA or EIS in order for the Secretary to approve a TERA for a 
tribe to develop its wind resources; but, a TERA requires a tribal 
environmental review of the project itself. The tribe incurs the costs of the 
TERA-required tribal environmental review process, and the DOI incurs the 
costs associated with the NEPA analysis. But the tribe also incurs costs 
associated with the NEPA analysis by virtue of having to wait for the EA or 
EIS to be completed. The complexity and dual costs of the NEPA analysis 
and the TERA-required tribal environmental review process exemplify one 
of the most significant problems with TERAs: many tribes may not be able 




                                                                                                                 
 192. See Royster, supra note 169, at 1090. 
 193. See id. at 1090-91 (“NEPA . . . applies to federal approvals of tribal resource 
development leases and agreements.”). 
 194. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). 
 195. Royster, supra note 1, at 119-20 (“The front-end costs of time, money, and staffing 
to develop a TERA and shepherd it through the approval process are substantial, if not 
prohibitive. The back-end costs of providing an environmental review process and 
addressing public input into tribal decisions and compliance are similarly substantial. These 
costs mean that ITEDSA may ultimately be useful to only a small cadre of tribes with 
considerable energy resources to develop. For a tribe seeking to place a few solar collectors 
on tribal land or harvest forest residues as biomass, however, the TERA process may be 
more of a barrier than an opportunity.”). 
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The ITEDSA attempts to address the costs associated with federal review 
of a TERA application by mandating a 270-day approval period for 
TERAs.
196
 TERA regulations, however, allow for an extension of this 
requirement if both the Secretary and the tribe agree to such an extension.
197
 
This raises two interesting questions that have not yet been answered. First, 
what happens if the tribe does not consent to an extension—i.e., if a tribe 
submits a TERA for a utility-scale wind or solar facility on tribal trust land, 
but the Secretary requests an extension of the 270-day review period which 
the tribe denies, does the tribe have a cause of action against the Secretary 
for which it can recover damages? Second, can the tribe compel the 
Secretary to complete the TERA process within the statutorily mandated 
270-day period in order to mitigate any financial losses stemming from an 
extension? 
Although there is no way to know for sure, the answer to the second 
question is almost certainly no because there is no statutorily mandated 
timeframe in which to complete a NEPA analysis.
198
 Absent some 
contractually obligated duty to complete a NEPA analysis in a certain 
timeframe, courts generally do not find agencies to have violated the NEPA 
simply because the NEPA analysis requires an extensive amount of time to 
complete.
199
 The standard time period to complete a NEPA analysis varies 
from three months or less to one year.
200
 This timeframe is fluid, and will 
almost certainly be greater if an EIS is required.
201
 Moreover, a suit for 
injunctive relief could not commence until after the 270-day review period 
                                                                                                                 
 196. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(A) (2012) (“Not later than 270 days after the date on which 
the Secretary receives a tribal energy resource agreement from an Indian tribe . . . the 
Secretary shall approve or disapprove the tribal energy resource agreement.”). 
 197. 25 C.F.R. § 224.56 (2015) (“The Director's receipt of a tribe's complete application 
begins a 270-day statutorily mandated period during which the Secretary must approve or 
disapprove a proposed TERA. With the consent of the tribe, the Secretary may extend the 
270-day period for making a decision.”). 
 198. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.8 (2015) (stating that CEQ has not set “inflexible” time limits, but 
instead “encourages” agencies to set time limits appropriate for individual actions). 
 199. Cf. Coal. on W. Valley Nuclear Wastes v. Bodman, 625 F. Supp. 2d 109, 120 
(W.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 592 F.3d 306 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating Plaintiffs did not show that 
DOE’s two-step NEPA analysis violated DOE’s contractual obligation with Plaintiffs to 
complete the NEPA analysis without undue delay and in an orderly fashion). 
 200. NEPA Web Guide: CEQ 40 FAQs, Questions 35-40, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160302222736/http://www.blm.gov:80/wo/st/en/prog/planning
/nepa/webguide/40_most_asked_questions/questions_30-40.html (Question 35, “Time 
Required for the NEPA Process”) (last visited Apr. 21, 2017). 
 201. Id. 
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has run, so even if a court would hear such a suit, it is unlikely that the 
redressability component of standing could be met. 
The answer to the first question is much more uncertain. If the Secretary 
requests an extension of the statutorily mandated 270-day review period, 
but the tribe does not consent, then the Secretary is required to fulfill his or 
her statutory obligations.
202
 However, the ITEDSA states that 
[T]he United States shall not be liable to any party (including 
any Indian tribe) for any negotiated term of, or any loss resulting 
from the negotiated terms of, a lease, business agreement, or 
right-of-way executed pursuant to and in accordance with a tribal 
energy resource agreement approved by the Secretary under 
paragraph (2) [relating to the 270-day approval requirement].
203
 
Paragraph 2(A) states that “[n]ot later than 270 days after the date on which 
the Secretary receives a tribal energy resource agreement from an Indian 
tribe . . . the Secretary shall approve or disapprove the tribal energy 
resource agreement.”
204
 It is clear from the statute that the Secretary is 
absolved from liability after the TERA is approved, but the statute is silent 
as to whether any liability attaches to the Secretary upon receipt of a TERA 
and failure to approve or disapprove within the 270-day timeframe. The 
Indian law canons of construction may hue in the tribes’ favor in this 
regard, but a general rule of administrative law is that agency decision-
making is not subject to judicial review until that decision becomes a final 
agency action.
205
 If the Secretary does not meet this 270-day mandate, then 
the tribe would have to show that the Secretary unreasonably delayed 
deciding on the TERA application,
206
 or otherwise undertook some agency 
                                                                                                                 
 202. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2) (2012).  
 203. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(D)(ii). 
 204. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(A).  
 205. Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 
62, 71 (1970) (“[T]he relevant considerations in determining finality are whether the process 
of administrative decisionmaking has reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt 
the orderly process of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined 
or legal consequences will flow from the agency action.”); Gulf Oil Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of 
Energy, 663 F.2d 296, 310 n.80 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“We have previously defined an order as 
‘final’ for purposes of judicial review when it ‘impose(s) an obligation, den(ies) a right, or 
fix(es) some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process.’”) (quoting 
Fidelity Television v. FCC, 502 F.2d 443, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
 206. Administrative Procedure Act § 706(1)-(2)(a), Pub. L. 89–554, 80 Stat. 378, 393 
(codified as 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)-(2)(a) (2012)). 
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action that was arbitrary or capricious. The likelihood of success in such an 
argument, however, is minimal at best. 
The final problem associated with a TERA is that each TERA must 
undergo periodic review by the Secretary who may disapprove
207
 the TERA 
if he or she believes that the trust asset managed under the TERA is in 
“imminent jeopardy.”
208
 The Secretary’s ability to continually review and 
even disapprove a TERA is curious given the waiver of liability in § 
3504.
209
 Essentially, § 3504 creates a loophole where the federal 
government retains oversight authority of tribal resource management even 
after a TERA is implemented,
210
 but the government absolves itself of any 
liability once the TERA is approved.
211
 The fact that no tribe has yet 
entered into a TERA indicates the ITEDSA’s failure to promote energy 
development in Indian Country, specifically with regards to renewable 
energy. 
At the least, TERAs are an option available to tribes concerned about 
sovereignty and jurisdiction, but TERAs are far from an ideal option for 
tribes.  Congress’s inclusion of the ITEDSA in the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 was a positive sign for both Indian tribes and renewable energy 
businesses. However, it is troubling that no tribe has submitted or been 
approved for a TERA, especially since TERAs currently represent the 
greatest opportunity for tribal self-determination regarding energy 
development.
212
 Even with the TERA structure in place, energy 
development in Indian Country proceeds under the traditional model of 
tribal leases subject to Secretarial approval. This not only diminishes tribal 
sovereignty, but also creates development delays that are costly both for 
tribal governments and for non-tribal entities wishing to invest in Indian 
energy resources. 
IV. Indian Energy Development Projects 
Despite all the negative statistics, lack of funding, and inadequate federal 
policies surrounding renewable energy development in Indian Country, 
some tribal governments, Indian corporations, and nonprofit entities have 
                                                                                                                 
 207. 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.63(b) (2015) (“[T]he Secretary, upon a finding of imminent 
jeopardy to a physical trust asset, [may] take actions the Secretary determines to be 
necessary to protect the asset, including reassumption under subparts F and G of this part.”). 
 208. Id. § 224.63(a)-(b). 
 209. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(A)(ii)(D)(ii). 
 210. Id. § 3504(e)(7)(A)-(D). 
 211. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(A)(ii)(D)(ii). 
 212. See Kronk, supra note 190, at 830-34. 
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succeeded in meeting the needs of a small number of tribal members who 
do not have adequate access to energy. These initiatives range in size, 
scope, and goal objectives, but each is uniquely tailored to address a 
discrete energy issue in Indian Country. 
A. Hopi NativeSUN Solar Electric Enterprise 
The Hopi NativeSUN Solar Electric Enterprise (SEE) addresses the 
difficulties of access to energy in non-grid areas by issuing low-interest 
revolving loans to non-grid property owners so that they can purchase and 
install REGU units on their property.
213
 Participants receive a maximum 
loan amount of $7,000 for forty-eight months at an 8% interest rate with 
which they purchase the photovoltaic solar cells and storage batteries.
214
 To 
date, SEE has installed more than 300 units on homes in non-grid areas of 
Indian Country.
215
 SEE should be considered a success because it fills a gap 
that is not adequately addressed by the market and provides access to 
energy to property owners who otherwise do not have it. 
B. Navajo Tribal Utility Authority 
The Navajo Tribal Utility Authority (NTUA) rents hybrid REGUs that 
consist of an 880-watt solar array, a 400-watt wind turbine, and a battery 
bank to tribal members in non-grid areas.
216
 To date, the NTUA has rented 
approximately 263 of these REGUs at a cost of approximately $75 per 
month.
217
 The rental costs pay for the NTUA maintenance of the REGUs 
and installation training for its personnel. Although the program is funded 
in part by federal grant money from the Department of Energy, the NTUA’s 
program suffers the same barriers to entry and budget constraints as that of 
SEE.
218
 Like SEE, the NTUA program is an Indian-driven solution to a 
                                                                                                                 
 213. SALLY MACADAMS, COMMUNITY POWER AGENCY, TOWARDS ENERGY SOVEREIGNTY: 
CASE STUDIES FROM NORTH AMERICAN FIRST NATIONS 8-10 (June 2016), http://cpagency.org. 
au/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Towards-Energy-Sovereignty-First-Nations-case-studies-from-
North-America.pdf.   
 214. Id. 
 215. Guevara-Stone, supra note 73. 
 216. Wind Turbines Power Remote Navajo Homesteads, NAWIG NEWS: Q. NEWSL. OF THE 
NATIVE AM. WIND INTEREST GROUP (Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Golden, Colo.), Spring 
2004, at 1, http://www.ntua.com/solar/nawig-PV.pdf. 
 217. Guevara-Stone, supra note 73. However, even those residents who can afford this 
price are not eligible for the PTC or ITC because they do not own the REGU. 
 218. See Ibby Caputo, Solar Power Makes Electricity More Accessible on Navajo 
Reservation, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/21/4010 
00427/solar-power-makes-electricity-more-accessible-on-navajo-reservation (“The Navajo 
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problem that is all too prevalent in Indian Country. Although widespread 
distribution of the REGUs has not occurred, the program’s success can be 
summed up by the statements of one NTUA REGU installer: “We have all 
of these big power plants on our reservation, and we benefit very little from 
them. Although it creates jobs and produces royalty, we still have to buy 
our electricity. These hybrid units are used on the reservation to produce 
energy for the people.”
219
 
C. Moapa Micro Grid Project 
The Moapa Micro Grid is a 252-kilowatt hybrid solar, wind, and diesel 
generator facility that powers the tribe’s business district containing the 
tribal council building and a shopping center.
220
 The business district is the 
primary on-reservation employment center.
221
 The micro grid project was 
funded by a $2.38 million grant from the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
High Energy Cost Grant program, which issues grants for energy efficiency 
programs in areas where energy costs are 275% above the national 
average.
222
 Prior to the micro grid‘s introduction online, the Moapa 
powered the business district with several diesel generators, which cost the 
Tribe approximately $1.5 million per year to operate and maintain.
223
 The 
new micro grid is projected to save the Tribe nearly $700,000 per year.
224
 
Since the project is funded with grant money rather than a loan, the savings 
to the Tribe are immediate, and the project does not have to undergo a 
lengthy return on investment period.
225
 
                                                                                                                 
Tribal Utility Authority has deployed 260 solar panel units, but currently there is no funding 
for more.”). 
 219. Wind Turbines Power Remote Navajo Homesteads, supra note 216, at 2.   
 220. John L. Smith, Solar Panels Good Deal for Moapa Tribe, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Apr. 
10, 2014), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/solar-panels-good-deal-for-moapa-tribe/. 
 221. Id. 
 222. USDA Administrator Joins with Stronghold Engineering and Project Partners to 
Dedicate New Solar Project at Moapa Paiute Travel Plaza in Nevada, ALTENERGYMAG.COM 
(Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.altenergymag.com/news/2014/04/08/ usda-administrator-joins-
with-stronghold-engineering-and-project-partners-to-dedicate-new-solar-project-at-moapa-
paiute-travel-plaza-in-nevada/32991.  
 223. Native Americans and Renewable Energy, 1ST TRIBAL LENDING, https://www. 
1tribal.com/2014/09/native-americans-and-renewable-energy/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
 224. Id. Similar to the Moapa, the Alaskan village of Tuntutuliak ran on a diesel micro 
grid until the tribe, in a partnership with the Alaska Energy Authority, constructed a 450-
kilowatt wind-diesel hybrid system to power the town. The tribe expects to save 
approximately $500,000 and over 70,000 gallons of diesel per year. The previous diesel 
system cost the tribe about half of its annual budget. Guevara-Stone, supra note 73. 
 225. See Smith, supra note 220. 
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The Moapa are also planning to bring online the largest utility-scale solar 
array on tribal lands by the end of 2016.
226
 This project will consist of a 
250-megawatt solar array,
227
 and will represent a significant step forward 
for the Tribe for two reasons. First, the Tribe has already obtained a power 
purchase agreement with the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 
which guarantees the project’s financial stability.
228
 Second, the 550-
megawatt Reid Gardner Generating Station, which is a coal-fired power 
plant near the reservation, is scheduled to be fully decommissioned in 
2017.
229
 The Moapa have been active in their opposition to the plant, which 
they cite as a cause of asthma, lung diseases, and severe allergies among 
tribal members.
230
 Although the Tribe stands to gain a significant revenue 
stream from its utility-scale solar array, the energy generated therefrom will 
be almost exclusively consumed off-reservation.
231
 Therefore, those Moapa 
tribal members who do not have grid-access to energy will not see any 
direct energy benefit from the project. 
D. The Campo Band of Kumeyaay Wind Farm 
The Campo Band of Kumeyaay Indians developed a wind farm 
consisting of twenty-five two-megawatt turbines on their reservation near 
San Diego.
232
 This project is unique because the Tribe does not receive any 
revenue from the energy sales.
233
 Rather, the Tribe leases the land to a third 
party energy developer who owns the wind energy infrastructure, sells the 
energy, and receives the financial and tax incentives.
234
 While it is 
beneficial that the Campo Band of Kumeyaay incurs little-to-no financial 
risk from the project, the revenue the Tribe receives from the lease 
                                                                                                                 
 226. First Solar Breaks Ground On 250 MW Moapa Southern Paiute Solar Project, 
SOLAR INDUS. MAG. (Mar. 24, 2014), http://solarindustrymag.com/first-solar-breaks-ground-
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agreement is less than it would receive if the Tribe were a partner in the 
energy sales.
235
 However, because the tribal government is not eligible for 
federal tax credits, it is financially more prudent to lease the land to a non-
tribal corporation that can take advantage of the tax credits to offset the 
costs of the project. 
The most notable aspect of the aforementioned projects is that even 
though each is an energy project designed to expand energy availability in 
Indian Country, each project addresses access to energy in a different 
manner. This underscores not only the breadth of access to energy issues in 
Indian Country, but also the complexity of these issues. The lack of access 
to energy in Indian Country is not one issue affecting one discrete group of 
people. Instead, there are many different energy access issues affecting 
different population segments within many different tribes. Although each 
of the projects above are different from each other, they all have one thing 
in common that significantly contributes to their success: they are Indian-
driven solutions to Indian problems. This may seem trivial, but Indian 
control over projects in Indian Country—especially development and 
economic projects—is strongly correlated with the long-term success of 
those projects, as well as Indian perceptions of those projects. 
Consequently, even though non-tribal entities may be involved in 
renewable energy development projects in Indian Country, it is important 
that these entities both recognize and respect tribal input, even if the tribe is 
not a majority shareholder or otherwise does not have a controlling interest 
in the project. 
V. Conclusion 
Understanding the history of the United States’ policy toward Indians is 
critical to understanding the current issues that affect access to energy in 
Indian Country. Issues of access to energy in Indian Country developed 
over the span of many decades, and solutions to these issues will likely take 
several more decades to formulate and implement. Improving access to 
energy in Indian Country will require not only significant changes to the 
federal regulatory scheme for renewable energy development, but will also 
require the creativity and tenacity of the Indian people whose everyday 
lives are shaped by their energy access. There are already promising signs 
from both tribal governments and tribal members that greater focus, 
awareness, and effort are being placed on expanding energy access in 
Indian Country. Renewable energy development has the potential to create 
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a significant economic revenue stream for the tribal government, and 
possibly even individual tribal members who can sell surplus energy back 
to the grid. The question going forward is whether the federal government 
will work proactively to amend the statutory and regulatory structure to 
better suit the needs of the Indians so that tribal governments’ renewable 
energy development is cost-competitive with renewable energy 
development by private investors. 
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